How Ukraine fights Russian disinformation and how this can benefit Africa, By Olha Bilousenko

Russia systematically uses disinformation to advance its geopolitical goals. Research data indicates that the influence of Russian disinformation on European societies is quite significant. For instance, a study by Princeton University (USA), “Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts,” revealed that Russia is the global leader in using online disinformation during influence campaigns. Russia is responsible for 62 per cent of such interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Truth Must Come First

The number of influence campaigns in African countries is growing, with some of them linked to Russia. In its work with African audiences, the Kremlin employs the same methods as in Ukraine: spreading fake news, manipulating social media, promoting anti-Western narratives, and undermining trust in democratic institutions. Over the past three years, Ukraine has faced a large-scale information attack, developed counter-strategies, and gained valuable experience. This article examines which approaches have proven effective, which have not, and what lessons African countries can learn from Ukraine’s experience.

In early March, the Russian State Duma held a roundtable discussion titled, “Russia-Africa,” where high-ranking Russian officials emphasised the importance of “delivering truthful Russian news to African information spaces.” Russia views the West’s media policies in Africa as colonial and flawed, positioning itself as an alternative with a strong focus on anti-colonialism and youth engagement. To achieve this, Russia plans to expand its television network in Africa and establish centres for collaboration with African bloggers. These media platforms will serve as channels for spreading Russian narratives and exerting an even greater influence on African countries than before.

Overall, Russia aims to support African “Orthodox bloggers” and create religious content targeted at African audiences. At the same time, it continues to manipulate the anti-colonial narrative, presenting itself as the nation entrusted with the “noble mission of putting an end to information colonialism in Africa.”

Even now, Russia exerts significant influence over the media landscape in African countries, as it consistently pushes messages about the inability of African governments to function effectively and serve their nations’ interests, while simultaneously promoting anti-Western rhetoric. This anti-Western and anti-government discourse has contributed to civil unrest and coups in some countries.

Previously, military forces in three West African countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — overthrew their democratically elected governments, raising Russian flags as a symbol of resistance during protests. This serves as further evidence that Russian propaganda is deeply rooted and actively spreading within African information spaces. There is also a possibility that this propaganda, along with the associated anti-Western sentiments, could spread to Nigeria, the immediate neighbour of these countries, potentially further escalating tensions in the region.

Russia Has Done this Before

As Damilola Banjo’s report states, incidents of people waving Russian flags have already occurred in Nigeria. In particular, demonstrators in Kano not only waved Russian flags but also called on Russia to pressure the Nigerian government into changing its policies. President Bola Tinubu’s government responded by arresting several local residents, including a tailor who had sewn the Russian flags. and several Polish nationals linked to the incident. Russia, in turn, denied any involvement in the events in Kano. However, denial is nothing new for Russia.

After the annexation of Crimea — Ukraine’s peninsula — in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Russia’s official stance remained the same: “This is not Russia. These are ‘little green men.’ These are ‘unknown individuals.’” The presence of Russian flags among them, according to this narrative, was simply because they disliked Ukraine, were tired of living in it, and preferred Russia and its system.

Russia benefited from portraying its expansionist ambitions as the supposed natural aspirations of the residents of those regions to be part of Russia, rather than Ukraine. By doing so, Russia skillfully shifted the blame for its aggression onto Ukraine, claiming that Ukraine had neglected its citizens for years, leading those areas to seek separation and unification with Russia. For decades before these events, Russia had been spreading disinformation and propaganda among the Ukrainian audience, attempting to convince them that “an independent Ukraine has no future.” Without this informational groundwork, the events described above might not have taken place.

Russia had worked for years to destabilise Ukraine. It built a network of loyal media outlets and experts and influenced the audience through television content, such as TV series and films. In the 2000s, Ukraine’s media landscape was heavily dominated by Russian content. In its efforts to destabilise Ukraine, Russia promoted several key narratives:

1. Ukraine is a Failed State

This is a key narrative that Russia continues to spread about Ukraine — not only among Ukrainian audiences but also internationally. The aim is to make Ukrainians doubt their own statehood by promoting the idea that Ukraine is an artificial entity that came into existence by accident and that its statehood is a historical anomaly. Within this framework, Ukraine is depicted as a failed Western project doomed to collapse, due to its inability to function independently. Russian propaganda highlights frequent government changes, political scandals, economic crises, and internal conflicts as supposed evidence that Ukrainians are incapable of governing their own country. This narrative seeks to create the impression that Ukraine has no future without external control or integration into the so-called “Russian world.” In doing so, propaganda deliberately ignores the fact that Ukraine has a long history, including the existence of Kyivan Rus and numerous other historical milestones, proving its enduring statehood.

2. Ukraine is the Most Corrupt and therefore the Poorest Country

Russian propaganda exploits real corruption issues, exaggerating them to an extreme degree to portray Ukraine as a country where not only reforms but even normal life is impossible. At the same time, it hides the fact that in itself, it is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. This narrative is actively used to discredit Ukraine’s European integration efforts and undermine international support. Propagandists try to convince the world that Western aid to Ukraine is futile because all resources are supposedly embezzled. Additionally, this narrative fosters apathy among Ukrainians, leading them to lose faith in the possibility of change. It deprives them of agency, pushing the idea that efforts to improve the country, such as paying taxes or supporting reforms, are meaningless because everything will be stolen anyway.

3. Ukrainians in the West and East are Completely Different

For decades, Russian propaganda has attempted to divide Ukrainian society by emphasising regional differences and creating the illusion of “two Ukraines” — a pro-European West and a pro-Russian East. It has sought to instil hostility between these regions by portraying the East as “bad” to the West, and vice versa. At the same time, historical and cultural ties between different parts of the country were deliberately downplayed. Differences in language preferences, religious traditions, and political views were exaggerated to create an unbridgeable divide, supposedly making the existence of a united Ukraine impossible. This approach was used particularly aggressively during and after the Revolution of Dignity, as well as in the early years of Russia’s war against Ukraine, starting in 2014, when it attempted to justify its aggression by claiming that parts of Ukraine desired separation.

4. Western Ukraine is Full of “Banderites” and Nazis Who Hate Russia

This myth originates from Soviet propaganda, which has distorted the history of Ukraine’s national liberation movement by equating it with Nazism. In the modern context, Russian media and Kremlin officials use this narrative to justify aggression against Ukraine, claiming that the country harbours a “Nazi threat” that must be “eliminated.” Propagandists paint Western Ukraine as a stronghold of “radicals” who allegedly persecute Russian-speaking citizens and seek ethnic cleansing. This serves as a means for Russia to justify its crimes, while also attempting to sow division among Ukrainians by fostering regional animosity.

5. Ukraine Has No History or Culture of Its Own

For decades, Russian propaganda has sought to strip Ukraine of its cultural and historical identities by promoting the idea that Ukrainian statehood is temporary and that Ukrainian culture is either identical to Russian culture or merely an extension of it. Kremlin ideologues deny the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation, presenting it as part of a “unified Russian people.” They attempt to appropriate Ukraine’s cultural achievements, for instance, claiming that Kyivan Rus was “the first Russian state” and that prominent Ukrainian historical figures were actually “great Russians.” Furthermore, they actively distort historical memory by downplaying or falsifying events such as the Holodomor, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) struggle, and the Revolution of Dignity.

6. The Ukrainian Language is Not Real Because No One Writes Books or Makes Films in It

Russian propaganda has long promoted the idea that Ukrainian is merely a “dialect of Russian” or an artificially created language. It has spread claims that Ukrainian is incapable of being used for science, quality literature, filmmaking, or contributing to global culture. The goal of this narrative is to marginalise the Ukrainian language, reduce its usage, and push Ukrainians toward assimilation. In reality, despite long periods of Russification, Ukrainian has a rich literary, cinematic, and musical heritage that continues to develop, debunking this myth. This narrative also seeks to strip Ukrainians of their agency, suggesting that they cannot have an independent state if they do not even have a legitimate language of their own.

7. Ukraine Cannot Survive Without Russia’s Support

Russian propaganda tries to create the illusion that Ukraine is incapable of functioning independently — economically, politically, or militarily. For years, the Kremlin used gas dependency, trade wars, and political pressure to convince Ukrainians that their country could not survive without Russian resources and markets. This myth is also spread internationally to weaken global support for Ukraine. However, reality has proven the opposite: after severing many ties with Russia, Ukraine has continued to develop, find new partners, and overcome challenges — demonstrating its resilience as an independent state.

All these narratives work together to undermine national identity, weaken societal unity, and justify Russian aggression. However, reality and historical facts consistently debunk these claims, proving that Ukraine is an independent state with its own culture, language, and future.

How and why does Russia enter African countries?

For years, Russia has not only spread its messages and narratives in Ukraine but has also built a network for disseminating disinformation. Similar processes may occur or are already happening in African countries. Notably, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, funded by the US Congress to study security issues, has reported that Russia is the largest sponsor of disinformation campaigns on the continent.

In 2022, the centre found that pro-Russian actors used thousands of new, fake, and hacked accounts to spread pro-Russian narratives and manipulate social media algorithms, leading to two pro-Russian hashtags trending on X/Twitter. According to the centre’s report, the campaign aimed to create the appearance of global support ahead of the UN General Assembly vote in early March 2022 on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Nigeria voted “yes,” nearly half of the other African countries abstained.

“This is clearly an attempt to stir unrest and manipulate genuine grievances [against the government],” said Seigel. “Protests are a normal democratic act to demand change. These are precisely the acts that are seized upon by an external actor… which has become a key way for Russia to enter and exert influence in Africa.”

In other words, Russia sees African countries as a new target and is already working in several directions:

1. Spreading disinformation through the media. Russian propaganda networks actively use local media (and, in some cases, create their own) to spread distorted facts about the war and the food crisis, thereby fostering negative attitudes toward Western countries and their policies.
2. Using social media to spread pro-Kremlin narratives. The networks exploit social platforms to disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives, which may include manipulating public opinion and inciting protest sentiments.
3. Supporting anti-government sentiments. They actively promote anti-government sentiments by spreading information that undermines trust in authorities and contributes to destabilisation in the country.

What Has Ukraine Done to Counter Russian Information Aggression?

Ukraine was not immediately able to effectively adapt to the challenges posed by disinformation. Before 2014, Russian information aggression was not perceived as a critical threat, and mechanisms to counter it were underdeveloped. Russian TV channels were freely broadcast in Ukraine, while local pro-Russian media and politicians actively spread Kremlin narratives to the Ukrainian audience. The absence of a state strategy in the field of information security allowed Moscow to influence public sentiment for years, particularly in the east and south of the country.

After 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea and launched the war, Ukraine gradually began to develop mechanisms to counter disinformation. However, even then, the state response was often slow, and efforts were fragmented. For example, while some Russian TV channels were banned as early as 2014-2015, popular Russian social networks like VKontakte and Odnoklassniki continued to operate in Ukraine until 2017. Similarly, pro-Russian media outlets such as “112 Ukraine” and NewsOne remained in the information space for several more years before sanctions were imposed on them.

By 2019-2021, the fight against disinformation began to take on a more systematic approach, with the state, civil society organisations, and academic institutions working together to develop strategies.

Overall, efforts to counter disinformation can be divided into several key areas.

1. State Initiatives

• Blocking pro-Russian Resources. In 2017, Ukraine blocked Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, followed by a series of propaganda media outlets (RIA Novosti, Sputnik, RT). In 2021, the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) imposed sanctions on pro-Russian TV channels “112 Ukraine,” NewsOne, and ZIK, which were spreading Kremlin narratives.
• Establishing the Center for Countering Disinformation and the Center for Strategic Communications. In 2021, the NSDC created the Center for Countering Disinformation to analyse information threats, while the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy launched the Center for Strategic Communications. Both institutions work to address information challenges, research disinformation, and strengthen Ukraine’s information security.
• Media Literacy Development Strategy. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine developed a multi-year strategy aimed at enhancing public resilience to disinformation and manipulation.
• Legislative Initiatives. In 2022, Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Media Law, establishing clearer regulations for combating disinformation and overseeing online platforms.

2. The Role of Civil Society

• Developing Media Literacy and Critical Thinking. Ukrainian NGOs, research institutions, and schools, with support from international organisations and donors, have implemented systematic programmes to equip citizens with skills to recognise fake news, manipulation, and information attacks. One of the key actors in media literacy has been the NGO “Detector Media.” A significant milestone was the inclusion of media literacy in Ukraine’s school curriculum. The Academy of Ukrainian Press, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science and international organisations, developed educational modules for teachers, integrating media literacy into subjects such as history, Ukrainian language, and civic education. International donors, including USAID and IREX, have actively supported media literacy in Ukraine. For example, in 2018, the “Learn to Discern” programme was launched, covering hundreds of Ukrainian schools and training thousands of teachers in effective information analysis.
• Fact-checking Organisations. Several Ukrainian initiatives focus on researching disinformation, debunking fake news, and exposing manipulations to a broad audience. These include StopFake, VoxCheck, “Beyond the News” (По той бік новин), “Nota Yenota” (Нота Єнота), and “Detector Media.” These organisations analyse media content, uncover manipulations, and educate audiences on critical thinking.

3. Use of Digital Technologies and Social Media

• Rapid Debunking of Fake News. Ukrainian official institutions and fact-checkers actively use Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to counter disinformation. For instance, the Center for Countering Disinformation regularly exposes Russian manipulations about frontline events.
• Telegram Channels and Chatbots. Special bots have been launched to report fake news, including the StopRussiaChannel, which systematises information about hostile online resources.

4. International Cooperation

Ukraine collaborates with the EU, NATO, and international organisations such as EUvsDisinfo, which help analyse and counter Russian disinformation at a global level.

Which Methods Can Be Considered Successful?

According to the head of the Center for Strategic Communications, Ihor Solovey, one of Ukraine’s successful cases in countering hostile informational threats is the establishment of a structured approach to commenting on events and providing accurate, reliable information in this manner.

“From the first days of the war, the only officials authorised to comment on military events were the president, the chief of the General Staff, the commander-in-chief, the minister of defense, and the minister of foreign affairs. This hierarchy extended to the media, and no other figures commented on events directly related to military operations,” Ihor Solovey explains.

Another successful case was the “United News” telethon organised by the Ukrainian government and major television channels at the beginning of the full-scale war. The telethon aimed to provide daily updates on security conditions and the activities of state institutions. “Despite criticism, for the first year and a half, it mobilised the information space and society, preventing the opening of a new front and strengthening Ukrainian unity. For these reasons, its duration has been set until the end of martial law,” he adds.

Ihor Solovey also emphasises that fighting disinformation is not only a matter of legal regulation but also media community awareness. “We do not have military censorship as such, so self-censorship has worked due to the high level of responsibility among journalists who understand that their material has a cost. And that cost is not only in monetary terms for an article or a report but also in human lives. The high level of media awareness is one of the phenomena of these years of war,” he says.

Another successful practice, according to him, is active engagement with foreign journalists. “This is a matter of strategic communication. Ukraine has never before hosted as many foreign journalists as it does now. The interest of international media, especially at the beginning of the full-scale war, was enormous. We worked hard to improve interaction with these media and developed an effective system,” explains Ihor Solovey.

However, he also believes there are areas where Ukraine could be more effective. “Alongside traditional media, which are reputable, have editorial offices, employ journalists, verify information, and maintain professional standards, a new media empire has emerged—social networks and news-sharing platforms. These are often anonymous sources, and the problem is that people tend to trust them more than official sources. This is our shortcoming,” says Ihor Solovey.

“When working with these platforms, we face challenges. Some act responsibly and engage in dialogue, while others are less accountable, turning their platforms into hubs for disinformation. One of our shortcomings is that the state has not taken more decisive action against these networks and has not shut them down in Ukraine, as it previously did with Russia’s VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. Instead, the government has issued recommendations, but this approach has not been fully effective,” he concludes.

Conclusions

Russia systematically uses disinformation to advance its geopolitical goals. Research data indicates that the influence of Russian disinformation on European societies is quite significant. For instance, a study by Princeton University (USA), “Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts,” revealed that Russia is the global leader in using online disinformation during influence campaigns. Russia is responsible for 62 per cent of such interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Overall, Russian disinformation is dynamic and adaptive. It changes and adjusts to the context depending on the circumstances. To systematically counter it and successfully build resilience against disinformation, it is not enough to simply address its consequences and debunk falsehoods. A proactive approach is necessary, as it strengthens resilience.

Strategic communication approaches can be particularly useful in this regard and should be further developed to enhance effectiveness. These approaches should be integrated into various state systems. Specifically, every government institution, including national agencies and municipal authorities, should have an action plan for critical situations and informational threats.

As media expert Olha Danchenkova writes, it is also crucial to build trust with the audience and understand their expectations and fears before adversaries exploit them to undermine democratic institutions.

Olha Bilousenko is a Ukrainian journalist, disinformation expert, and researcher.